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COMMENTS
The Establishment of Mandatory
Sealanes by Unilateral Action
Introduction
On the morning of March 18, 1967, the S.S. Torrey Canyon, a tanker of
120,890 deadweight tons, ran aground off the southwest coast of England.
She ultimately released 118,000 tons of crude oil into the English Channel.'
In January 1971, the 17,000 ton tanker, Arizona Standard, proceeding into
San Francisco Bay, collided with her sister ship, Oregon Standard, which
was outbound with a cargo of bunker oil. This collision resulted in the re-
lease of 840,000 gallons of oil into the bay and along the Pacific coast.
2
The possibility of more catastrophic oil spills is very real. Aside from any
oil pollution which may occur as a result of such incidents, there is always
the overriding consideration of the immediate loss of life and property.
Preventive measures must be taken now to reduce the risk of these inci-
dents to the lowest possible level. The immediate consequences of such
incidents involving the release of petroleum into the sea are well known.
The long range injury caused to our environment is yet to be determined.
One of the methods of pollution control which can reduce the possibility of
these incidents is the use of mandatory sealanes.
Immediately after the Torrey Canyon disaster, the British government
submitted a note to the Third Extraordinary Session of the Inter-Govern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (hereinafter cited as IMCO)
Council.8 The note suggested, inter alia, that preventive measures of a
technical nature, such as mandatory sealanes, be explored to reduce the risk
of future incidents. 4 The use of mandatory sealanes has also been recom-
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1967, at I, col. 5.
2. Id. Jan. 19, 1971, at 74, col. 1.
3. IMCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which deals with interna-
tional maritime affairs. YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 501 (1958).
4. J. Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. RE V. 155, 193 (1968).
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mended by other groups. One panel recommended that "[f]urther study
be made on designation of sealanes for control of tanker routing and that
steps be taken to develop and implement a U.S. plan for avoidance of haz-
ardous or unique areas by tankers carrying oil and other hazardous sub-
stances. Every effort should be made to make use of designated sealanes
mandatory rather than at the option of the tanker Captain." 5 The purpose
of this paper is to present a general analysis in international law of the con-
cept of mandatory sealanes. The major portion of the paper is concerned
with the unilateral approach to the establishment of mandatory sealanes.
The Basic Scheme
In this paper the term "sealane" is used in the same way as the term is em-
ployed by IMCO, to connote a traffic separation scheme in which the main
purpose is to "produce an orderly flow of traffic for the purpose of reducing
the risk of collisions and/or strandings mainly in areas of converging
routes or high traffic density." 6 The basic element in the sealane concept is
that of establishing a buffer zone between opposite flows of traffic. This
can be done by establishing a buoy system or by using natural obstacles to
regulate the flow of traffic.
Such schemes require rules to ensure a smooth flow of traffic. Adherence
to these rules by all vessels is, of course, of utmost importance. It has been
argued that even if as little as ten percent of the vessels operating in a sea-
lane fail to comply with the rules, the sealane concept is incapable of meet-
ing its objective. 7  The validity of this contention seems quite reasonable
when the situation at sea is compared with the havoc caused on highways
by the small minority of automobile drivers who fail to abide by the rules.
In order to ensure that the rules of the sealanes are obeyed, some type
of enforcement procedure must be followed. There are three approaches
which can be taken in implementing a sealane. First, a plan could be de-
veloped such that the lanes are recommended to all vessels; but there would
be no legal requirement that lanes be used, or if used, the rules obeyed.
Thus, no legal enforcement would be possible. There would, however, be
other procedures whereby strong pressures could be placed on vessels failing
to adhere to the rules. This could be done by the shipping organizations.
A second approach could be made by having recommended lanes, but com-
5. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON OIL SPILLS, THE OIL SPILL PROBLEM 20 (1969).
6. IMCO, Ship's Routing and Traffic Separation Schemes 5 (1971).
7. A. Manning, The Role of Compulsory Sealanes in Resolving Multiple Use Con-
flict on the Continental Shelf 57, April 15, 1971 (unpublished thesis in Coast Guard
Headquarters).
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pulsory obedience to the rules when the lanes are used. Since the areas
most in need of sealanes are straits and channels, this plan would be similar
to the third approach, the concept of mandatory sealanes, and basically
would present the same problems of enforcement. Vessels using routes
where mandatory sealanes are established would be required to use the sea-
lanes and adhere to their rules. Vessels such as fishing boats and pleasure
craft would also be required to adhere to certain rules and procedures while
crossing a sealane.
If either of these last two schemes is developed, either unilaterally or by
multilateral agreement, there are grave enforcement problems which must
be solved. Although a large majority of the work involved with the estab-
lishment of sealanes is now being performed through international organiza-
tions, particularly IMCO, there are several real advantages to the unilateral
approach.
Establishment of mandatory sealanes by unilateral action could be per-
formed with greater rapidity than the conventional approach, since there
would be no requirement to obtain the agreement of other states. Such a
unilateral scheme would allow a coastal state to seize the initiative in de-
veloping a preferable system which could serve as an example for other
states. In addition, the objectives and mechanics of the scheme would not
be subject to dilution or compromise through the bargaining process of in-
ternational conventions.
Admittedly, there are disadvantages to a unilaterally established system.
Basically, sealanes are an international problem. Treating such an inter-
national problem on a unilateral basis could increase world conflict, provide
for a lack of uniformity, and would be difficult to enforce. There is also
the chance that other states may reciprocate with even more stringent laws
for foreign vessels in their waters and ports. Nevertheless, the need to pre-
vent marine oil pollution exists now. It is not enough merely to mitigate or
compensate for loss as provided for in the Convention Relating to Interven-
tion on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties8 and the Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 9 The only international
agreement dealing broadly with the preventive aspects of oil pollution of the
oceans, the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil,10 does not confer any authority on coastal states to assert
8. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 471
(1970).
9. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done
Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970).
10. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done
May 12, 1954, [1961], 3 U.S.T. 2990, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
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jurisdiction for pollution control purposes beyond the 12-mile contiguous zone.
This convention leaves enforcement of its prohibitions to the flag state of the
offending vessel, rather than the interested coastal state.
Must a coastal state allow the risk of even greater catastrophies to con-
tinue while awaiting the results of possibly years of bargaining at an inter-
national convention? Instead, should not a state be allowed to take action
to protect its special interests as long as the action is reasonably compatible
with the rights of other states and is both necessary and reasonable?
The unilateral approach will be investigated by analyzing the authority
and enforcement problems in the coastal states' internal waters" and terri-
torial waters,' 2 and finally on the high seas.' 3  The type of vessel considered
in this paper is limited to privately owned commercial vessels or government
vessels used as commercial vessels.
The History of Sealanes
The basic concept of such sealanes is one which has been used in the past.' 4
In 1847, Lt. Matthew Fontaine Maury of the U.S. Navy proposed a ship
routing system which was based on seasonal weather patterns. He sought
to reduce travel time between major ports, rather than to provide for safety
at sea. Later, in 1855, after the advent of the steam-powered vessels and
the disastrous collision between the Artic and the Vesta, Maury published
a work entitled LANES FOR STEAMERS CROSSING THE ATLANTIC. The pur-
pose of this traffic separation scheme was to reduce the risk of col-
lision. According to the plan the east-bound and west-bound lane of the
Atlantic were separated by a distance of 200 miles. The system was man-
datory for U.S. Navy vessels.
In 1911, a traffic separation scheme was developed on the Great Lakes
by the Lake Carriers' Association, and today the success of the scheme is a
generally accepted fact, borne out by the significant reduction in the rate of
11. Internal waters include ports, harbors, bay and other enclosed areas of the sea
along the coast which are on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea.
See Article 5(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
done at Geneva on April 29, 1958, [1964], 2 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention].
12. "The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal
waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea." Terri-
torial Sea Convention, Art. 1 (1).
13. "The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State." Convention on the High Seas, done
at Geneva on April 29, 1958, Art. 1 [1962], 2 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].
14. This brief history of sealanes was taken exclusively from A. Manning, supra
note 7.
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collision. Another ship routing scheme which has been used was developed
during World War II. This system is the Northern European and Mediter-
ranean Routing Instructions (NEMEDRI) which identifies mine swept
channels. This system is still in use, and proposals have been developed to
widen the NEMEDRI routes and transform them into traffic separation
schemes.
In the Gulf of Mexico a shipping safety fairway system has been devel-
oped. The main purpose of these fairways is to maintain a safe lane for
shipping through the oil rigs which have been placed in growing numbers
on the continental shelf. In 1966 the United States Coast Guard realized
the potential danger in confining shipping to these fairways and proposed
the adoption of traffic separation schemes. However, since the traffic sep-
aration schemes need approximately three times the sea area required for the
fairway system, there has been strong resistance from the powerful Gulf oil
interests.
As of March 1971 the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO has adopted
65 traffic separation schemes throughout the world and is actively consider-
ing additional schemes. These schemes are only recommended routes and
are not mandatory; or even if the waters are used, there are no mandatory
rules. The member governments of the organization have been invited to
advise their vessels to use the routes and to obey the rules.' 5 In October
1971, however, IMCO recommended "that Member Governments of the
Organization should make it an offense for ships of their flag which use
any traffic separation scheme adopted by the Organization to proceed
against the established direction of traffic flow."'" At the same time in
another resolution, IMCO recommended the adoption of a new regulation
to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960.17 This
regulation, inter alia, recommends the use of sealanes to all ships concerned,
directs the contracting governments to use their influence to secure the ap-
propriate use of adopted routes and requires ships which use sealanes to
proceed in the specified direction of traffic flow. It appears that this regu-
lation is a significant step in the implementation of the second type of
scheme mentioned above, i.e., recommended sealanes and mandatory rules.
The adoption and enforcement of this regulation would alleviate to some
extent the need for unilateral action.
15. IMCO, supra note 6, at 4.
16. Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Resolution A. 228
(VII) adopted on October 12, 1971.
17. Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Resolution A. 205
(VII) adopted on October 12, 1971.
[Vol. 22:108
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Mandatory Sealanes In Internal Waters
The fact that a state has the same competence over its internal waters as it
has over the land areas within its boundaries has long been established.
Due to the physical proximity of internal waters, their use has a direct ef-
fect on the state. Thus, comprehensive control of its own internal waters is
generally thought to be indispensable for the protection and promotion of the
reasonable interests of any state.' 8
These interests of the state may be protected by the regulation of all
vessels entering its internal waters. The state claims sole jurisdiction to
regulate all activities in these waters. Such activities include movement and
anchorage of vessels, sanitary and safety conditions, fees and payments for
services, and assignment of berths. These regulations are so common that
arguments by foreign states against a coastal state's authority to regulate
are virtually nonexistent.19
Enforcement in Internal Waters
Since the coastal state's authority over foreign vessels in internal waters is
fully comprehensive, specific enforcement methods would best be applied
with the concepts of reciprocity and the comity of nations in mind. One
possible method of enforcement is to subject the owner or captain of a
guilty ship to a criminal charge involving a fine-just like a driver running
a red light. There is another method which has been suggested that invites
analysis. This is to deny entry to the ports of the coastal state to those ves-
sels of a foreign state not complying with the sealane regulations. Such re-
fusal to allow entry could be applied to all vessels of a state whose vessels
have generally failed to comply, or refusal could be on an individual basis.
In addition to the political and economic problems involved in this "closed
port" concept, there are at least three legal grounds on which a foreign state
may argue in support of its right of access to the coastal state's ports. These
legal grounds are based upon both customary and conventional international
law.
1. Customary International Law
First, there is support in customary international law for the assertion that in
time of peace, foreign merchant vessels have a right of free access to the
18. McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 64 (1965) [herein-
after cited as McDOUGAL].
19. Id. at 96. In the United States the authority to establish mandatory sealanes
has recently been clarified by the enactment of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
of 1972. Basically, the Act gives the Secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard operates the authority to establish, operate, and maintain vessel traffic
systems which include vessel traffic routing schemes. P.L. No. 92-340 (July 1972).
1972]
Catholic University Law Review
ports of coastal states.20 The rationale behind this argument is the promo-
tion of the smooth operation of the international transportation system and
full utilization of the oceans. Nevertheless, the vast majority of writers still
believe that the coastal state has full authority to deny entry to foreign ves-
sels arbitrarily. 21 An American court reflected this belief in Khedivial Line,
S.A.E. v. Seafarers' International Union,22 where it was argued that a
United Arab Republic vessel had an unrestricted right of access to an Ameri-
can port. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the
plaintiff had presented no precedents or arguments to show that the law of
nations records such a right.
23
The second argument against the concept of a closed port is based on the
right of innocent passage. 24 This argument may take the approach that
since the right of innocent passage through a coastal state's territorial wa-
ters is generally based on the free flow of commerce, it would be defeating
the purpose of this right to allow a vessel to sail through the territorial
waters only to be denied access when internal waters are reached. This
argument, however, ignores the comprehensive authority of the coastal state
over its internal waters. Although there is little doubt concerning the right
of innocent passage through the territorial waters of a coastal state, the
validity of extending the right into internal waters is incompatible with the
comprehensive authority which the coastal state exerts over the entry of per-
sons and vessels into its territory.
2. Conventional International Law
There is also a basis in conventional international law for the second argu-
ment. Article 5(2) of the Territorial Sea Convention acknowledges a right
to innocent passage in certain internal waters. 25 This right, however, ap-
plies only to an exceptional situation. It is strictly limited to those unique
cases where the territorial sea or high seas have been designated internal
waters due to the straight baseline method of determining the baseline from
20. SCHWARZENBFRGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 198 (3d ed. 1957).
21. McDoUGAL 107.
22. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
23. Id. at 53.
24. Generally, the right of innocent passage is the right of a foreign vessel to
navigate through the territorial sea of another state for the purpose of traversing that
sea. This right has been codified in some detail in section III of the Territorial Sea
Convention.
25. "Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 has
the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered
as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage, as
provided in articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters." Territorial Sea Conven-
tion, Art. 5(2).
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which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This method is de-
scribed in Article 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention and is generally ap-
plied only to those states with ragged coastlines and numerous islands im-
mediately off-shore, e.g., Norway. Thus, while the waters are now internal
waters, historically the right of innocent passage (if formerly territorial wa-
ters) or freedom of the seas (if formerly high seas) already existed in those
areas. This is not the case in internal waters generally, or ports in particular.
The third counter-argument a state may have is under conventional in-
ternational law. A state may have a specific treaty which permits it to have
access to the ports and territories of the coastal state. These treaties are
usually referred to as treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation.
26
In the context of open ports, the main purpose of this type of treaty is to
ensure that the foreign state will not be discriminated against with respect to
national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment. 27 The foreign country
could argue that a "closed port" system is contrary to the treaty between it
and the coastal state. Since the denial of entry, however, would be based
on the violation of regulations which are applicable to all states and would
be equally enforced, such action could not be considered discriminatory.
Therefore, it would be unlikely that denial of access would be violative of
the coastal state's current treaty obligations of this specific type.
28
The preceding arguments of the foreign state, although not without merit,
are not persuasive. The coastal state has the authority to prescribe, regu-
late, and enforce mandatory sealanes in its internal waters without violating
international law. The right to enforce the proper use of the sealanes would
include the right to deny access. The real issue is how best to enforce the
regulations to assure compliance and at the same time instill a cooperative
attitude from other states. Certainly, the denial of access would be a most
severe sanction to be applied only after other enforcement methods have
failed, and with the knowledge that possible undesirable actions could be
taken by the foreign state under the guise of reciprocity.
2 9
26. 1 S. METZoER, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 225 (1966).
27. Basically, a most-favored nation clause in a treaty would grant to contracting
parties all favors which the other contracting party has granted in the past, or will
grant in the future, to any third state. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
TREATISE 877 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948). E.g., Treaty with Japan on Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, April 2, 1953, [1953], 2 U.S.T. 2065, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
28. This subject has also been treated by multilateral convention. Convention on
the International R6gime of Maritime Ports, signed at Geneva on December 9, 1923,
58 L.N.T.S. 285.
29. For an example of a situation where this possibility was recognized, see Pro-
gram of Policy Studies in Science and Technology of George Washington University,
Legal, Economic, and Technical Aspects of Liability and Financial Responsibility as
Related to Oil Pollution 5-2 (December 1970) (unpublished study in Coast Guard
Headquarters) [hereinafter cited as Program of Policy Studies].
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Mandatory Sealanes in Territorial Seas
There are generally two theories concerning the authority which the coastal
state exerts over the marginal maritime belt outside the internal waters of
the state. The majority view reasons that this belt comprises part of the
territory of the coastal state, thereby giving the state complete sovereignty
over these "territorial seas." The minority view suggests that the powers of
the coastal state in these seas fall short of complete sovereignty, the state
having certain powers of control, jurisdiction, police, and the like in the in-
terests of the safety of its coast.30
Even in the majority view, however, there is one important distinction
between the coastal state's sovereignty over its internal waters and its ter-
ritorial waters. This difference is the right of innocent passage.A' The doc-
trine of innocent passage is the primary objection which may prevent the
coastal state from establishing mandatory sealanes in its territorial waters.
Presuming that a coastal state may not arbitrarily deny a foreign vessel
the right of innocent passage in its territorial waters, to what extent may
passage be regulated? The doctrine of the right of innocent passage is codi-
fied in section III of the Territorial Sea Convention and will be the focal
point of this analysis.
A. Regulation of Vessels in Innocent Passage
At the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Article 17
of the Territorial Sea Convention was adopted as proposed by the International
Law Commission (ILC) in Article 18 of its draft of a model convention.8 2
The Article provided:
Foreign ships exercising the right of passage shall comply with the
laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity
with the present rules and other rules of international law and,
in particular, with the laws and regulations relating to transport
and navigation.
During the meetings at the Conference there were numerous proposals to
change the wording of the ILC Article 18.83 After a great deal of discus-
30. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, A TREATISE 487 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1955) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM].
31. McDOUGAL 185.
32. Int'l Comm'n, Report, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Report]. The United States proposed omitting the word
"enacted" since this connoted formal legislative action. The position of the United
States was that all laws and regulations of the coastal state which meet the other
stated requirements should be given equal recognition. Id. at 221.
33. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 80,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39 (1958) [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL RECORDS].
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sion, all of these proposals were rejected. Both a Mexican and a Greek
proposal were accepted provisionally, but failed to be accepted together in
a final form.84 The Committee then returned to the basic ILC form and
accepted it by a vote of 59 to 0 with three abstentions.
Although the commentaries to the ILC draft were not incorporated into
the Convention on the Territorial Sea, they can be used to construe the
meaning of a particular article of the Convention. Such use of the com-
mentaries is particularly meaningful where, as in Article 17, the LLC draft
was accepted as proposed. The commentary relating to this article states
that international law recognizes the right of a coastal state to enact, in the
general interest of navigation, special regulations applicable to ships exer-
cising the right of passage.8 5 As examples of those interests subject to pro-
tection by regulation, the Commission noted, inter alia, the safety of traffic
and the protection of the waters of the coastal state against pollution of any
kind caused by ships.86 The commentary to ILC Article 18 also mentioned
that the use of the route prescribed for international navigation was pro-
posed for the list of examples of those interests subject to regulation. 7
This routing clause, however, was not listed in the examples to ILC Article
18 since the enumeration was not meant to be exhaustive. Thus, Article 17
of the Convention is a proper source of authority for mandatory sealanes,
provided they are in confomity with the other articles of the Convention and
other rules of international law.
Articles of the Convention which may be used as arguments to prohibit
mandatory sealanes are Articles 14(1-5), 15(1), and 16(4). Each of
these articles, which confers the right of innocent passage and places certain
duties on the coastal state, must be construed in the light of Article 17,
which imposes certain duties on foreign ships during innocent passage. This
relationship is expressed in Article 14(4), where it is stated that "[s]uch
passage shall take place in conformity with these articles and with other
rules of international law."
Allowing that the above noted articles do not prohibit the establishment
of mandatory sealanes in territorial waters, the remaining issue is whether
there are other rules of international law which would prohibit such a regu-
34. The proposed Mexican amendment would have applied "in conformity with the
present rules and other rules of international law" to the foreign vessels in innocent
passage and not to the enactment of laws and regulations by the coastal state. Id.
at 96, 102. The Mexicans did acknowledge, however, that the laws and regulations
must conform with the rules of international law as expressed by ILC. Article 1(2)
and 17(1). Id. at 97.
35. Report 20.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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lation. The purpose of innocent passage is to compromise the two compet-
ing policies-sovereignty and maximum use of the oceans. The establish-
ment of mandatory sealanes would promote maximum use of the oceans by
providing a plan to lessen the chance of collision or grounding. Thus,
mandatory sealanes would seem to be compatible with the purpose of inno-
cent passage as defined by the customs of international law. Regulation of
foreign vessels exercising their right to innocent passage does not diminish,
but rather enhances, the enjoyment of the right so that it may be utilized
by all states in the safest and most beneficial manner.
In summary then, the sovereignty of the coastal state would be affirmed
by this authority to police and exercise control in the territorial sea. This
authority to order foreign vessels to take certain routes in territorial waters
and to avoid others has been acknowledged in the past as a proper exercise
of a coastal state's sovereign right.a
8
B. Enforcement of Mandatory Sealanes in Territorial Waters
Presuming for the moment that mandatory sealanes in territorial waters are
not prohibited by conventional or customary international law, what action
may the coastal state take to enforce the regulations on foreign vessels?
Violation of such regulations would be a criminal offense, and thus does
not involve the problems of the exercise of civil jurisdiction, although civil
liabilities could be included.
There are three basic situations which are of concern in the enforcement
of mandatory sealanes in territorial waters. These situations exist when a
vessel violates the rules of, or completely fails to use, the required traffic
scheme; and is either (1) enroute to the port of the coastal state, (2) sailing
out of the port, or (3) only passing through the territorial sea. In the third
situation the coastal state's connection with the foreign vessel is most tenuous,
and therefore is the situtation which will be analyzed.
1. Authority over Transient Vessels
Two methods of enforcement over transient vessels which violate sealane
regulations that could possibly be applied by the coastal state are 1 ) exclu-
sion from the territorial waters, and 2) diversion into port followed by pro-
ceedings against the master, owner, or vessel. These proceedings could cul-
minate in a fine to, or even imprisonment of, the guilty party. Generally,
both of these methods would result in substantial detriment to the foreign
vessel, and certainly would be considered grave sanctions to apply. Either
38. OPPENHEIM 493.
[Vol. 22:108
Mandatory Sealanes
practice would need to be viewed in the context of balancing the interests
of the coastal state against the need for the smooth operation of world sea
transportation. The interests sought to be protected by the coastal state
must be substantial in order to overcome the right of innocent passage89 and
the need for unhindered flow of commerce.
In an actual collision, there would be substantial interests affected, or
likely to be affected, which would allow the coastal state officials to proceed
with an investigation of the collision and the arrest of persons suspected of
contributing to the cause of the collision by failure to obey the sealane pro-
cedures.4 0  Of primary importance, however, is the enforcement of the sea-
lane regulations as a preventive measure, i.e., before any collision, rather
than as retribution for the results of a violation. In the latter case the actual
effect of a violation by a foreign vessel on the coastal state is of questionable
substantiality. On the other hand, it may be argued that the threat of po-
tential collision and resulting damage to the coastal state's interests is suf-
ficient.
The Territorial Sea Convention does not explicitly provide for the en-
forcement of the laws and regulations of the coastal state, nor does it spe-
cifically prescribe standards for penalties for violations. Authority for en-
forcement would, however, seem to be implicit in Article 17, particularly
in the case of navigational regulations. Professor Sorensen, an influential
participant in the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, anticipated this
interpretation when he stated:
It is made clear by Article 17 that foreign ships exercising the
right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations
of the coastal state, in particular those relating to transport and
navigation. Thus, it follows that the coastal state is authorized
to enforce its laws and regulations on foreign ships passing through
the territorial sea . . .41
Such an interpretation has also been supported by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
and Professor Leo Gross. 42
39. C. FRANKLiN, 53-U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE-INT'L L. STUDIEs 154 (1961).
40. McDOUGAL 293. In the case of the Franconia, however, the Court for Crown
Case Reversed ruled against the assertion of jurisdiction proclaimed by a lower British
court. In this criminal case a British and German vessel collided in territorial waters.
Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876).
41. McDOUGAL 273 n.236.
42. Id. Professor Gross stated: "Whether the text of Article 17 will obviate dis-
putes relating to the applicable national enactments and their conformity with the
Convention and customary international law remains to be seen. In particular it re-
mains to be seen whether the right to enforce these enactments, implicitly recognized in
Article 17, includes the right to prevent a ship from passing through the territorial sea."
Gross, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Right of Innocent Pas-
sage Through the Gulf of Aqaba, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 564, 592 (1959).
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Philip C. Jessup many years earlier approached the question on the basis
of customary international law and reached the conclusion that:
. . . [T]he right of innocent passage does not guarantee to the
vessel exercising it a total immunity from the processes of the local
laws. Only where the littoral sovereign's conduct amounts to an
unreasonable interference with navigation can the flag state pro-
test.4
8
Thus, the standard of reasonableness in customary international law is
available for challenging allegedly excessive sanctions.
a. Exclusion of a Vessel
i. Conventional International Law
The authority of a coastal state to exclude a vessel from its territorial sea is
supported by Article 16(1) of the Territorial Sea Convention: "The coastal
state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage
which is not innocent." The issue is, what is innocent passage? That pas-
sage may be denied because it is not innocent is clear; but does the violation
of a coastal state's regulations pertaining to the required use of sealanes
make the passage "non-innocent"? If the violation of the regulation can not
be considered such as to label the passage non-innocent, can a vessel be ex-
cluded for violating the regulation without a finding of non-innocent pas-
sage?
The general criteria of passage which may be classed innocent is indicated
in Article 14(4) of the Territorial Sea Convention:
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to peace, good
order or security of the coastal state. Such passage shall take
place in conformity with these articles and with other rules of in-
ternational law.
The United States' delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference stated that
the second sentence in the above quotation was meant to indicate that a ship
in innocent passage must conform to the laws and regulations of the coastal
State. However, such laws and regulations could not prohibit innocent pas-
sage."'44  Arguably, this would seem to indicate that the position of the
United States is that the laws and regulations of the coastal state (for ex-
ample, those pertaining to sealane regulations) could not be enforced by
prohibition of passage. On the other hand, it could mean that the laws
cannot simply prohibit innocent passage without saying whether or not laws
43. P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
122-23 (1927) (emphasis added).
44. OFFICIAL RECORDS 83.
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could prescribe refusal of the right of innocent passage as a sanction for vio-
lation of the laws. As an example of the former argument it is interesting
to note that the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 (WQIA) 45 re-
quires evidence of financial responsibility of both national and foreign ves-
sels "using . . . the navigable waters of the United States for any purpose. ' 46
One study of the Act contends that sections ll(p)(1) and (2) prohibit any
foreign vessel from merely traversing the United States' territorial sea with-
out complying with the WQIA requirements; and thus, is in violation of
Article 14 and 15 of the Territorial Sea Convention.
47
The records are not clear whether the distinction between the coastal
state prohibiting passage as non-innocent and the coastal state prescribing
regulations to which the transient vessel must comply was ever accepted by
the Conference. While there was an apparent compromise between those
states which felt passage could only be non-innocent if there was a threat to
the security (not the economy or ideology) of the state and those states
which felt the coastal state could decide the question of innocence on the
basis of its "interests," the United States' distinction is still arguably main-
tained by the two separate sentences which were adopted as Article 14(4)
quoted above. One delegate to the Law of the Sea Conference has written
that "It]here must really be something going beyond the mere existence
of local laws and regulations as such-something that could be considered
as tainting the passage even if there happened not to be any specific domes-
tic law or regulation under which it was locally illegal. These various ideas
are reflected in paragraph 4 of Article 14 of the Convention. .... -48
With this ambiguity in the record there is certainly latitude for a coastal
state to argue its right to exclude foreign vessels. There is, however, the
test of reasonableness which must be applied. Although the coastal state
may argue that it may exclude to protect interests other than "security,"
there would still seem to be a logical requirement that the threat of damage
be substantial. The violation of a sealane rule or failure to use a sealane,
by themselves would presumably fail to meet the necessary element of a
substantial threat. In certain situations, however, the risk of collision or
stranding may be so great that such a threat could be shown.
If violation of a sealane rule or failure to use prescribed sealanes does not
make passage non-innocent, Article 16(4) of the Territorial Sea Convention
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(p)(1) (1970).
47. Program of Policy Studies 5-18, at n.34.
48. G. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea,
8 INT'L AND COMp. L.Q. 73, 95 (1959).
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would prohibit the exclusion of a foreign vessel where the waters involved
are straits as described in that article. However, in the case of narrow con-
gested straits, the possibility of determining passage to be non-innocent as a
result of a vessel's failure to use the prescribed sealanes would be a worth-
while case to argue since the risk of collision and the chances of substantial
detrimental effect on the coastal state are very high in these waters.
ii. Customary International Law
There is evidence in customary international law of the right to exclude a
vessel which claims the right of innocent passage. Prior to the codification
of the right of innocent passage, the famous Corfu Channel Case49 ex-
amined some of the difficult problems dealing with innocent passage. In
1946, two British destroyers were damaged by mines while steaming through
the Straits of Corfu, part of which is within the territorial waters of Albania
and Greece. Great Britain thereafter sent minesweepers through the Straits
and discovered a newly laid field of anchored mines near the place where
the destroyers had been struck. Great Britain demanded compensation, while
Albania protested the premeditated violation of its sovereignty. Of particu-
lar relevance is the manner in which the International Court of Justice as-
sessed the reasonableness of the Albanian claim that both passages were non-
innocent. While there is disagreement as to whether the predominant
factor was the manner of conducting the passage, as opposed to the purpose
of such passage,50 it appears that the court put great stress on the foreign
vessel's version of its purpose.,' The court found the initial passage to have
been innocent.
If it is the purpose of passage which determines the question of innocence,
then there would seem to be little argument for a foreign merchant vessel
in passage being classified as non-innocent merely for the violation of a sea-
lane regulation. The purpose of merchant vessels would seldom be other
than innocent. Thus, a foreign merchant vessel on a mission of peaceful
trade could not be classified as being in non-innocent passage after the vio-
lation of sealane regulations. In summary, the establishment of mandatory
sealanes in the territorial sea by a coastal state is most probably a legitimate
exercise of its police power in controlling the manner of passage. By creat-
ing such sealanes the state is protecting legitimate interests and at the same
time promoting the smooth flow of commerce. As in the case of internal
waters, the major problem is enforcement. The problem, however, is dif-
49. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
50. McDouGAL 243.
51. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 30.
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ferent in significant aspects. For example, where enforcement in internal
waters is limited by self-restraint of the coastal state for political and eco
nomic reasons, enforcement in territorial waters is limited by an acknowl-
edged right of international law. Although a state may properly exclude a
vessel from innocent passage, exclusion for a sealane violation would most
likely be justified only after a vessel had been warned and continued to
violate the regulations, or if a particularly hazardous situation existed.
As a practical matter, the problems which face a coastal state seeking to
exclude a foreign vessel in innocent passage would also be present when a
coastal state diverts a vessel in innocent passage into port for judicial pro-
ceedings. Such an action could arguably cause more detriment to the foreign
vessel than exclusion from passage and could be thought of as an even
greater hampering of innocent passage.
Mandatory Sealanes on the High Seas
A. Freedom of the High Seas
1. Customary International Law
In 1604 Grotius wrote the Mare Liberium in which he proclaimed, ex-
plained, and practically fabricated the doctrine of the freedom of the seas.
52
He based his argument on the "most specific and unimpeachable axiom of
the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which
is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every
other nation, and to trade with it. ''5 3  Grotius emphasized that the sea
could not be occupied nor its resources exhausted.
54
Today, the doctrine of freedom of the high seas is universally accepted;
however, inroads have developed which limit its force and application, e.g.,
contiguous zones, claims of 200 mile wide territorial seas, and the baseline
theory of territorial waters. While the doctrine is still accepted, the reason-
ing in support of it has been replaced. No one can deny that several states
now have the technology and armaments to successfully occupy almost any
area of the high seas. Furthermore, there is ample evidence today that the
resources of the sea can be destroyed or exhausted by both navigation and
fishing.
The more acceptable reason for the freedom of the high seas is to allow
freedom of communications and commerce between the states of the world
which are separated by the seas. The seas act as international highways
52. H. GROTIUs, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (R. Magoffin transl. 1916).
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id. at 28.
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which connect distant lands, and therefore, should not be claimed by any
state. In the interest of free intercourse between the states, the principle
of the freedom of the high seas has become universally recognized and
supported. 55
As a general rule of international law an independent state may assert
jurisdiction whenever such jurisdiction is not excluded by some principle of
international law. As was stated by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the case of the S.S. Lotus:
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally
accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order
to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.
Restrictions upon the independence of states cannot therefore be
presumed.56
The issue in this case was whether Turkey could institute criminal proceed-
ings against the officer of a French merchant vessel which had entered Tur-
key's port after a collision on the high seas. As a result of the collision a
Turkish vessel was damaged and Turkish lives were lost.
The Court also spoke specifically of vessels on the high seas:
It is certainly true that-apart from certain special cases which are
defined by international law-vessels on the high seas are subject
to no authority except that of the state whose flag they fly. In vir-
tue of the principle of the freedom of the seas, that is to say, the
absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, no state
may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over the vessels upon them."
The conclusion reached by the Court was that there is no rule of interna-
tional law applicable to collision cases which states that criminal proceedings
are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state whose flag is flown. The
Court based its jurisdiction on the fact that the collision took effect on a
Turkish vessel which was assimilated to the territory of Turkey. The Court
did not consider the idea of the nationality of the victim since this contention
was based on the case where the nationality of the victim was the only
criterion for jurisdiction. The Court, therefore, set forth the general rule
that restrictions on the independence of states must be found in conventions
or accepted usages. Then, finding no such convention or usage concerning
criminal proceedings following a collision, the Court allowed Turkey to take
jurisdiction on the assimilation theory.
55. OPPENHEIM 593.
56. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18.
57. Id. at 25.
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Based on The Lotus reasoning it would be fair to say that a coastal state
may assert jurisdiction over a foreign vessel on the high seas if the actions of
the vessel have a detrimental effect on the territory of the coastal state. In
the case of a violation of an established sealane there is a detrimental ef-
fect on the territory of the coastal state because of the potential for disaster.
Must the coastal state refrain from taking appropriate measures to protect
itself until there is actual damage or violation of its laws? The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the law of nations allows a state to
secure itself from injury by exercise of its power beyond the limits of its
territory. In Church v. Hubbart5 s the Court, in the context of a state's
right to prohibit any commerce with its colonies, stated:
Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right, is an
injury to itself which it may prevent, and it has a right to use the
means necessary for its prevention. These means do not appear to
be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain the
same at all times and in all situations. If they are such as un-
necessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign na-
tions will resist their exercise. If they are such as are reasonable
and necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will be sub-
mitted to.59
Thus, arguably the prevailing standards of any assertion of extra-territorial
jurisdiction are "reasonableness" and "necessity."
The United States has in the past asserted limited jurisdiction outside its
territory. In 1935 legislation was passed which authorized the President to
declare, under specific conditions, a "customs enforcement area" which
could extend 50 miles outward from the 12 mile limit of customs waters
and for 200 miles along the coast. Within this area, customs officials were
authorized to board, search and seize national and foreign vessels when en-
forcing any law respecting the revenue. 60 Again, in this case the proponents
of the bill argued, "[t]hat the only test of the extent to which a nation
may extend its jurisdiction in proximate areas of the high seas is the test of
reasonableness. ' 61
The United States has also asserted limited jurisdiction on the high seas in
prescribing danger zone regulations which give exclusive use for a limited
time to United States military vessels. 62 In most cases the claimed right to
58. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
59. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). Contra, Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241,
279 (1808), where the Court stated: ". . . [A] seizure of a person not a subject, or of
a vessel not belonging to a subject, made on the high seas, for the breach of a mu-
nicipal regulation, is an act which the sovereign cannot authorize."
60. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-11 (1970).
61. P. Jessup, The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 105 (1937).
62. 33 C.F.R. §§ 204.1-204.232 (1971 Supp.).
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exclude is for only a brief period, but in some instances authority has been
asserted for several years.63 A direct analogy to limited jurisdiction on the
high seas is the regulation of the air space over these seas. In this regard,
the United States has established Air Defense Identification Zones in air
spaces which are partly over the high seas. When flying through these
zones the United States requires that all aircraft must file position reports
either when it enters a zone or when not less than one hour and not more
than two hours average cruising distance from the United States via the
most direct route.
0 4
The precedents given above are based either on the right of self-defense
or protection of customs. The British have also made similar extensions of
jurisdictions based on the right of self-defense and customs, e.g., the so
called Hovering Acts,6 5 and later the Customs Consolidation Act of 1876
which declared British right to seize foreign vessels within an undefined dis-
tance of the coast. 6 In a recent order, effective November 22, 1971, the
British government has extended its power to control and even destroy oil
tankers threatening to pollute the United Kingdom's coastline. After the
effective date the power applies to foreign vessels outside British territorial
seas.6 7 The authority for this order was derived from the Oil in Navigable
Waters Act of 1971.68
The Canadians have also taken unilateral action to combat oil pollution
on the high seas by enacting stringent and comprehensive anti-pollution
legislation which declares an anti-pollution zone covering all waters within
100 miles of the Canadian Arctic coast.6 9 The Act forbids pollution in
that zone, imposes penalties and civil liabilities for all violations, and empow-
ers the Governor in Council to prescribe regulations relating to navigation in
designated Arctic waters. Among other matters, these regulations prescribe
routes of passage. Vessels failing to comply with the regulations may be pro-
hibited from navigating within certain zones. As a means of enforcement
vessels may be boarded, seized, fined, or forfeited after seizure.70 The United
63. McDougal 593.
64. 14 C.F.R. §§ 620.12(b)(2) (1960 Supp.).
65. 9 Geo. 2, c.35 and 24 Geo. 3, c.47.
66. The Customs Consolidation Act of 1876, 39 and 40 Vict. c.36.
67. JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Nov. 4, 1971, at 22.
68. Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971 c. 21, § 8.
69. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, CAN. REy. STAT. 1st Supp. c.2
(1970), 18 and 19 Eliz. 2, c.47. It has been suggested that the Act is part of Canada's
plan to motivate the IMCO nations to reorder their priorities from compensation to
prevention. D. Wilkes, International Administrative Due Process and Control of Pollu-
tion-The Canadian Arctic Waters Example, 2 J. MARITIME L. 499, 501 (1971).
70. Id. §§ 12.(l), 15.(3)(a), and 23.(1)-25.(1).
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States has expressed strong opposition to Canada's unilateral approach to this
problem.7
In response to Canada's argument that the Arctic Pollution Act was
partly based on the right of self-defense, one writer contends that the argu-
ment is "both weak and dangerous: Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter permits a right of self-defense only against 'armed attack,' and then un-
der narrowly defined conditions. Broadening the basis for defensive ac-
tion, as a matter of unilateral interpretation, raises obviously disturbing pos-
sibilities.
'72
2. Conventional International Law
This doctrine of freedom of the high seas has been codified in Article 2 of
the High Seas Convention. As under customary international law, the two
great freedoms enumerated in Article 2 are fishing and navigation.
The ILC commentary (5) to Article 27 of its draft (Article 2 of the
High Seas Convention) acknowledges the need for some regulation of free-
dom of the seas.73  At the convention the delegate from Mexico proposed
that the following be incorporated into Article 27 (Article 2): "Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles
and by the other rules of international law," and explained that his amend-
ment was based on the wording of paragraph 5 of the ILC commentary.
T4
This amendment was accepted as part of Article 2 of the High Seas Con-
vention. Although the commentaries were not incorporated into the Con-
vention, they are, nevertheless, evidence that a certain amount of regulation
of the high seas is allowed under international law.
There is further support for limited regulation of the high seas in the
last sentence of Article 2 of the High Seas Convention, which provides:
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States
with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in the exer-
cise of the freedom of the high seas.
71. "The United States does not recognize any exercise of coastal state jurisdiction
over our vessels in the high seas and thus does not recognize the right of any state
unilaterally to establish a territorial sea of more than 3 miles or exercise more limited
jurisdiction in any area beyond 12 miles." Statement of Robert J. McCloskey, N.Y.
Times, April 10, 1970, at 13, col. 3.
72. R. Neuman, Oil on Troubled Waters: The International Control of Marine
Pollution, 2 J. MAmTIME L. 349, 357-58 (1971).
73. "Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled to enjoy it,
must be regulated. Hence, the law of the high seas contains certain rules, most of
them already recognized in positive international law, which are designed, not to
limit or restrict the freedom of the high seas, but to safeguard its exercise in the
interests of the entire international community. ... Report 24.
74. 4 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 37.
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If the phrase "reasonable regard to the interests of other States" is to have
any meaning, the coastal state should be the state best qualified to define
those interests. If this qualification to define is allowed, it seems only rea-
sonable that some amount of control also be acknowledged.
This limited right to define and control is acknowledged in Article 24 of
the Convention on the Territorial Sea. 75  The authority to prescribe man-
datory sealanes could be reasonably supported by the authority granted by
Article 24 para. l(a) to prevent infringement of the coastal state's sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea.76 This authority, however,
is limited to the maximum extent of the contiguous zone which is 12 miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 77
Protection from oil spills would be required at a much greater distance.
But even accepting the validity of a coastal state's limited competence in a
contiguous zone, might not the state still exercise this right as far as is re-
quired for the effective protection of the interest at stake?
There are many factors to be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness and necessity, and hence the legality, of asserting authority (not sov-
ereignty) in contiguous zones. 78  The interest that is sought to be protected
should certainly be a substantial interest. Basically, the interest of the
coastal state is protection from oil pollution and all of its effects on water
and land. This interest is not only that of the immediate coastal state,
but also that of adjacent states. The damages of oil pollution are not con-
fined to the immediate area of a spill, but can be carried by the currents
and winds to other areas and spoil the ocean resources used in common by
all states.
The scope of authority asserted by the coastal state in unilaterally estab-
lishing sealanes is limited to regulation of passage and enforcement of
these regulations. Such authority is certainly not insubstantial, but must
be weighed in comparison with the interest at stake, and with the manner
in which these regulations and enforcement procedures affect the nature
and significance of the use of the vessels of all states. One significant factor in
75. "In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State
may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its terri-
tory or territorial sea." Territorial Sea Convention, Art. 24(1).
76. R. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses
on the Law of the Sea, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 14 (1970).
77. "The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Territorial Sea Conven-
tion, Art. 24(2).
78. McDouoA. 579.
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allowing limited coastal state authority beyond its territorial sea is that it
would curtail the need for claims to wider and wider territorial seas.7
9
It is also important to note that the basic rights of navigation and fishing
would in no way be prohibited, but rather regulated to a limited extent.
The regulations would allow a more beneficial use of the contiguous waters
by all states, and yet, provide the coastal state with the protection of its
more important interests.
Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas provides:
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from ships ...
Conceivably, this Article could be relied on for authority to extend manda-
tory sealanes beyond the 12 mile limit of the contiguous zone. Such regu-
lations would, however, be applicable only to the vessels of the enacting
state, or else each vessel would be covered by a multitude of regulations.
There is a strong counter-argument to be made for exclusive jurisdiction
by the flag state. Article 6(1) of the High Seas Convention provides:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one state only and, save in ex-
ceptional case expressly provided for in international treaties or in
these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas ...
This is the basis for the strong argument that unless a situation is covered
by a specific treaty or another article, the coastal state would lack jurisdic-
tion.
B. Enforcement on the High Seas
Enforcement presents a particularly difficult problem in view of Article 11
of the High Seas Convention. This article, in effect, statutorily overrules
the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in Lotus and declares
that only the flag state or the state of nationality of the responsible person can
take jurisdiction over such person in the event of a collision or other
navigational incident.80 Furthermore, Article 11 (3) limits the jurisdiction to
arrest or detain the ship, even for investigation, to the flag state.
In view of the nature of the violation of the coastal state's law, the minor
amount of actual effect on the coastal state, and the specific treaty obliga-
tions on the subject of arrest and detainment of vessels or personnel with
regard to navigational incidents, enforcement of the sealanes would proba-
bly be best accomplished by indirect methods, e.g., economic sanction. Or,
in the event of collision, national courts in civil cases could apply presump-
tions of negligence for failure to use the sealane.
79. McDouoAL 574.
80. High Seas Convention, Art. 11(1).
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Undoubtedly, the high seas is the maritime area in which it is most
difficult for a coastal state to validly assert authority to establish and en-
force mandatory sealanes. As one may expect, as the distance from the
terra firma of the coastal state increases, so does the strength of the counter-
arguments. The long established doctrine of freedom of the seas presents
a strong bulwark against unilateral encroachments. Nevertheless, the tre-
mendous damage caused by oil pollution requires that problems of multi-
use of the oceans be approached with a view to the future and not stymied
by a doctrine established under concepts which are no longer acceptable
today. Reasonableness and necessity are the concepts which must be ap-
plied to facilitate the use of the high seas by all states and to minimize the
risk of danger to interests of the coastal state without detriment to the legiti-
mate interests of all states.
Conclusion
Mandatory sealanes are not the panacea for oil pollution caused by colli-
sions and groundings. There are many practical problems involved with
their establishment, operation and enforcement. It is presumed, however,
that a workable scheme can be developed to alleviate such problems.
This writer feels that sealanes will someday be mandatory to all vessels
within certain classes. Whether these schemes will be established and en-
forced by independent coastal states or international organizations such as
IMCO is yet to be seen. If the objectives of the sealanes can be accom-
plished within a reasonable time through the efforts of an international or-
ganization, then this method is preferable to unilateral action. However, if
the international approach proves to be unreasonably slow in developing
an effective scheme, or after it is established, to lack the capability of proper
enforcement, then the unilateral approach must be applied wherever it is
reasonable and necessary to do so.
Perhaps the days of complete freedom to sail a vessel anywhere on the
high seas should be forced into the past, and replaced by a more responsible
doctrine which will place a greater burden on vessel owners. The injury
resulting from one vessel going aground in the time of Grotius would be mi-
nute compared to the enormous damage possible today from a behemoth
such as the Nisseki Maru which draws 89 feet of water and carries almost
3 million barrels of crude oil.8 '
James D. Morgan
81. TIME, Dec. 6, 1971, at 50.
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